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1100 
Note 
 
Armchair Jury Consultants: The Legal 
Implications and Benefits of Online Research of 
Prospective Jurors in the Facebook Era 
Adam J. Hoskins 
In the 2003 film Runaway Jury, Rankin Fitch—played by 
Gene Hackman—justifies his role as a scientific jury consultant 
by saying that “trials are too important to be left up to juries.”1 
At one point, this pronouncement carried the day in the Ameri-
can legal system, as jury consultants were de rigueur in the 
courtroom2 and scientific jury consulting was a $400 million per 
year industry.3 Jury consultants were—and, to a lesser extent, 
still are—used before, during, and after jury selection in high-
stakes cases.4 These trial consultants, though considered by 
many to be effective analysts of juror tendencies,5 were often 
prohibitively expensive.6 
 
  J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2008, 
Truman State University. The author would like to thank Professor Perry 
Moriearty for her invaluable guidance throughout the writing process. Many 
thanks also to the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their tire-
less work and dedication. Finally, the author would like to thank his wonder-
ful family and friends for their unwavering support and patience. Copyright © 
2012 by Adam J. Hoskins. 
 1. RUNAWAY JURY (20th Century Fox 2003). 
 2. See Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers: A 
Study of the Trial Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and What, 
If Anything, to Do About It, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 441, 442–43 (“So common is con-
sulting in large jury trials that one Boston trial lawyer opined, ‘[n]o self-
respecting trial lawyer will go through the process of jury selection in an im-
portant case without the assistance of highly-paid trial consultants.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 3. See Jonathan M. Redgrave & Jason J. Stover, The Information Age, 
Part II: Juror Investigation on the Internet—Implications for the Trial Lawyer, 
2 SEDONA CONF. J. 211, 211 (2001) (providing background information on the 
economic impact of jury consultants). 
 4. See id. 
 5. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 460 (“‘When real juror ver-
dicts are at issue, [scientific jury selection] has been shown to increase the 
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The advent of the Internet has made attorneys everywhere 
into amateur jury consultants.7 Many states facilitate such in-
vestigation by releasing information about prospective jurors 
weeks before jury selection.8 In these states, attorneys are free 
to search public records, perform Google searches on prospec-
tive jurors, or access jurors’ Facebook pages long before jury se-
lection begins.9 States that do not provide juror information in 
advance have seen attorneys use laptops in the courtroom to 
research potential jurors.10 This pretrial investigation of jurors 
is often effective in revealing information about prospective ju-
rors, as an increasing amount of Americans have detectable 
online presences.11 In this relatively uncharted technological 
area, there are competing concerns—some practitioners say it 
is tantamount to malpractice not to conduct Internet research 
on prospective jurors,12 while others warn that this practice is 
 
predictability of juror verdicts appreciably, especially if the evidence in the 
case is at all equivocal.’” (citation omitted)). 
 6. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 212. 
 7. See, e.g., id. at 211–12 (discussing how “the dawn of the internet age 
has provided a powerful new investigatory tool that can be utilized by attor-
neys themselves,” even in small cases).  
 8. See, e.g., State v. Harbison, 238 S.E.2d 449, 453 (N.C. 1977) (noting 
juror information released fifty-five days prior to the start of trial). 
 9. See, e.g., Christopher B. Hopkins, Internet Social Networking Sites for 
Lawyers, 28 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 12, 13–14 (2009) (recommending a series of 
online searches on potential jurors). 
 10. See, e.g., Evan Brown, Judge Should Have Let Lawyer Google Poten-
tial Jurors During Jury Selection, INTERNET CASES (Sept. 4, 2010), http://blog 
.internetcases.com/2010/09/04/judge-should-have-let-lawyer-google-potential-
jurors-during-jury-selection/ (examining a New Jersey state judge’s attempt to 
prohibit attorneys from researching potential witnesses during jury selection 
using the courthouse’s wireless Internet). 
 11. See Jeffrey T. Frederick, You, the Jury, and the Internet, 39 BRIEF 12, 
17 (2010) (noting that 77% of American adults use the Internet and 47% use 
social networking sites such as Facebook or Twitter). Further, the fact that a 
prospective juror does not have a detectable Internet presence conveys certain 
demographic information—age, intelligence, income level—that savvy attor-
neys may use in jury selection. Id.  
 12. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 218 (describing attorneys as 
bound by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to perform all possible In-
ternet research on prospective jurors); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CON-
DUCT R. 1.1 (2010) (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representa-
tion.” (emphasis added)). 
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ethically murky,13 invades jurors’ privacy,14 and contributes to 
biased juries.15 
Part I of this Note introduces the practice of jury investiga-
tion and describes its evolution and increasing prevalence in 
the Internet era. Part II identifies and analyzes the typical crit-
icisms of preselection jury investigation. Part III contends, 
however, that pretrial online investigation of potential jurors 
comports with the rationale of peremptory challenges, allows 
for more equal trial preparation between rich and cash-
strapped parties, and helps create more impartial juries and 
fairer trials. Finally, this Note proposes that because pretrial 
jury investigation results in fairer trials, states should uniform-
ly adopt a standard of providing information about potential ju-
rors in advance of jury selection, and explicitly sanction such 
investigation.  
I.  BACKGROUND ON INTERNET-BASED JUROR 
RESEARCH: A NEW LOOK AT A LONGSTANDING 
PRACTICE   
While online pretrial Internet research of jurors is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon, it is one that can be understood by 
examining longstanding jurisprudence on issues regarding jury 
selection. This Part examines the constitutional right to a jury 
trial, the process by which a jury is selected, the legality and 
prevalence of paid jury consultants, and the connection be-
tween jury selection and fairness of trials. 
A. RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that in criminal trials, a defendant has “the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State.”16 
Although the Constitution is silent on the matter, courts have 
defined an “impartial jury” as one that is “capable and willing 
to decide the case solely on the evidence before it” and not 
 
 13. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 218 (outlining a countervail-
ing argument that there are potential ethical concerns when conducting Inter-
net research on prospective jurors). 
 14. See Michael R. Glover, Comment, The Right to Privacy of Prospective 
Jurors During Voir Dire, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 708, 713 (1982) (warning that infor-
mation gathered from outside investigation may implicate privacy concerns). 
 15. See id. at 716–17 (theorizing that these privacy concerns may affect 
the partiality of the jury, implicating Sixth Amendment issues). 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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based on outside knowledge or prejudice.17 Judges have consid-
erable discretion in investigating alleged partialities among ju-
rors18 and may dismiss individual jurors or declare a mistrial to 
remedy such partialities.19 
In addition to the Sixth Amendment protection for criminal 
juries, the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury in 
many civil cases.20 The right to a jury is available “[i]n Suits at 
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twen-
ty dollars.”21 The right to a civil jury extends only to cases in-
volving legal, as opposed to equitable, claims.22 Since many new 
causes of action developed after the distinction between courts 
of law and equity was eliminated, courts determine the right to 
a jury trial for such claims by analogy to the Eighteenth Centu-
ry courts of law and equity.23 
B. JUROR SELECTION PROCESS 
The jury-selection process is responsible for populating 
these constitutionally protected juries.24 Voir dire is the method 
by which potential jurors—known as veniremen—are ques-
tioned about their predispositions and biases.25 Depending on 
the state, the court, parties’ counsel, or a combination conducts 
the juror examination.26 As part of the voir dire examination, 
 
 17. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Greig, 133 F. Supp. 2d 697, 701 (D.V.I. 
2001) (discussing the process by which the court explored an allegation that a 
juror disclosed extraneous and prejudicial information about the defendant). 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Dale, 614 F.3d 942, 959 (8th Cir. 2010) (not-
ing trial judges’ considerable discretion to remedy alleged impartiality). 
 20. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348 
(1998) (“[T]he Court has understood ‘Suits at common law’ to refer ‘not merely 
[to] suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceed-
ings, but [to] suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and deter-
mined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recog-
nized, and equitable remedies were administered.’”(citation omitted)). 
 23. See id. at 348–49. 
 24. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (2000). 
 25. See generally id. §§ 4–5 (discussing various modes of conducting voir 
dire in the state and federal systems). 
 26. Compare FED R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(1) (“The court may examine prospec-
tive jurors or may permit the attorneys for the parties to do so.”), and ALASKA 
R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (identical to Federal Rule), with MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 
subdiv. 4 (“The court must allow the parties to conduct voir dire examination 
to discover grounds for challenges for cause and to assist in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges.”). 
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prospective jurors may be asked questions, either orally or in 
writing.27 Such questions must be connected to the prospective 
jurors’ ability to serve fairly and impartially.28 In some cases, 
such a process can last several days.29 Trial judges retain a 
large amount of discretion in structuring the voir dire process.30 
Potential jurors may be eliminated from the jury pool 
through two mechanisms—strikes for cause and peremptory 
challenges.31 Counsel may strike an unlimited number of jurors 
for cause.32 Today, challenges for cause fall into one of two cate-
gories.33 The propter defectum class of challenges are brought 
because of a perceived defect in the prospective juror, such as 
“alienage, infancy, [or] lack of statutory requirement . . . .”34 
The second class of challenges, the propter affectum class, may 
be brought when jurors have “some bias or partiality” that af-
fects their competence to serve as a juror.35 For purposes of this 
Note, only the propter affectum class of challenges is relevant. 
When considering whether to disqualify a prospective juror 
for cause, courts look to the probability of bias or prejudice that 
would result by allowing the prospective juror to sit on the ju-
ry.36 A trial court generally must “consider the totality of the 
circumstances and grounds relating to a potential request to 
excuse a prospective juror, [and] to make a full inquiry to ex-
amine those circumstances . . . .”37 Any doubts about a juror’s 
qualifications must be resolved in favor of excusing the juror.38 
Challenges for cause must be premised on an individual’s actu-
 
 27. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 43 (2000). 
 28. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 472 S.E.2d 842, 851 (N.C. 1996). 
 29. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 13. 
 30. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986) (citing Ham v. 
South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973)).  
 31. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 61 (2000). 
 32. See id. § 68. 
 33. See, e.g., Butler v. Greensboro Fire Ins. Co., 145 S.E. 3, 4 (N.C. 1928) 
(noting a transition away from the traditional challenges that were “subdivid-
ed at common law into four classes: Propter honoris respectum, out of respect 
of rank or honor; propter defectum, on account of some defect; propter 
delictum, on account of crime; and propter affectum, on account of affection or 
prejudice”). 
 34. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greer, 682 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1984). 
 35. Id. at 923–24. 
 36. See, e.g., O’Dell v. Miller, 565 S.E.2d 407, 411 (W. Va. 2002). 
 37. E.g., Black v. CSX Transp., Inc., 648 S.E.2d 610, 615–16 (W. Va. 
2007). 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 616. 
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al qualifications and biases and not on assumptions based on 
stereotypes.39 
In addition to challenges for cause, many jurisdictions pro-
vide parties with a certain number of peremptory challenges.40 
If the jurisdiction allows such challenges,41 counsel may exer-
cise their allotted challenges to strike any potential juror with-
out cause.42 Counsel typically strike jurors perceived to be re-
sistant to their case, basing their decisions on information 
gleaned from the voir dire, jury questionnaire, juror research, 
or on stereotypes.43 When selecting the jury, attorneys often re-
ly on their experience and intuition to inform their selections, 
making decisions about jurors based on their “gender, profes-
sion, nationality, race, religion, physical features, economic 
strata, and even gait.”44 Clarence Darrow’s jury selection strat-
egy offers a glimpse into the role of stereotyping in jury selec-
tion.45 Darrow suggested that a lawyer “[n]ever take a wealthy 
man on a jury. He will convict unless the defendant is accused 
of violating the anti-trust law, selling worthless stocks or bonds 
or something of that kind.”46 Additionally, he stated both that 
“[an Irishman] is emotional, kindly and sympathetic”47 and that 
lawyers should keep “Unitarians, Universalists, Congregation-
alists, Jews and other agnostics.”48 
There are limits to peremptory challenges, however. In ju-
ry selection, attorneys are not allowed to exercise their peremp-
tory challenges based solely on the race49 or sex50 of the prospec-
tive juror. Prospective jurors can be excluded, however, for 
other Darrow-esque demographic factors, such as religion, po-
 
 39. See, e.g., State v. Lane, 922 A.2d 1107, 1111 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007). 
 40. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992) (citing Edmon-
son v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991)). 
 41. See id. (describing peremptory challenges as a state creation and not 
constitutionally protected by the Sixth Amendment). 
 42. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 72 (2000). 
 43. See id. §§ 84–89. 
 44. Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 465. 
 45. See Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, ESQUIRE, May 1936, at 
36, 211. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 37.  
 48. Id. at 211. 
 49. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986); see also Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618 (1991) (extending the Batson ruling 
to civil trials). 
 50. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending Batson’s ruling 
to peremptory challenges based on juror’s sex). 
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litical affiliation, or age.51 Though courts have, in dicta, dis-
couraged the use of peremptory challenges based on stereotype 
alone,52 attorneys generally have considerable latitude in exer-
cising their peremptory challenges.53 
C. JURY CONSULTING AND RESEARCH ON PROSPECTIVE JURORS 
Attorneys have long conducted pretrial research on pro-
spective jurors.54 The limits of juror investigation are set only 
by local rules55 and ethical constraints.56 Courts both 
acknowledge and permit pretrial investigation of potential ju-
rors.57 Many jurisdictions facilitate pretrial investigation by 
providing attorneys with names of potential jurors weeks be-
fore trial.58 Courts that do not release jury lists in advance often 
have wireless Internet connections for attorneys to use during 
jury selection.59 A party’s legal team can use this Internet ac-
 
 51. See Charles Nesson, Peremptory Challenges: Technology Should Kill 
Them?, 3 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 10 (2004) (“[R]ace and gender now stand 
as the only declared impermissible bases for peremptory challenges, but these 
lack any strong distinction from other demographic factors like religion or pol-
itics or age, which apparently continue to be legitimate grounds for perempto-
ry challenges.”). 
 52. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142. 
 53. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 32 P.3d 292, 295 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (cit-
ing United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000)) (noting that 
peremptory strikes reinforce Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury). 
 54. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3. 
 55. Id. at 212; see also, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 807 (detailing regula-
tions relating to juror questionnaires). 
 56. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 219 (noting attorneys’ ethical 
responsibility, under the ABA standards, to use only “investigatory methods 
that neither harass nor unduly embarrass potential jurors or invade their  
privacy”). 
 57. See, e.g., State v. Knerr, 426 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (“It 
is a recognized practice for an attorney to make investigations of prospective 
jurors so that [peremptory] challenges can be utilized intelligently . . . . There 
is no doubt that pretrial investigations of prospective jurors are both legal and 
common.”). 
 58. See, e.g., State v. Harbison, 238 S.E.2d 449, 453 (N.C. 1977); Redgrave 
& Stover, supra note 3, at 212 (“[M]any of these state laws explicitly state that 
the reason for releasing jury lists prior to voir dire is to permit counsel to un-
dertake pretrial investigation of prospective jurors.”). 
 59. See Amanda McGee, Note, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 316 (2010) (discussing how the Internet should be 
provided in courtrooms because “[i]n order to properly present their case, 
counsel must have stable access to laptops, cell phones, and other such tech-
nologies”). But see Katherine A. Helm, Courtrooms All Atwitter, NAT’L L.J. 
(Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202432841336 
(noting that some courtrooms have “bar[red] all communication devices from 
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cess to research prospective jurors during jury selection.60 When 
given juror information in advance, attorneys frequently out-
source this juror investigation to jury consultants, especially in 
high-stakes or high-profile cases.61 Attorneys and their hired 
jury consultants have considerable leeway in researching pro-
spective jurors, provided that they refrain from contacting the 
jurors or their families.62 Under the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, attorneys are responsible for the actions of those 
working for or underneath them, including jury consultants or 
paralegals conducting juror research.63 
The practice of researching potential jurors implicates con-
siderable privacy concerns.64 Though individuals may cede cer-
tain privacy expectations by performing public duties,65 indi-
viduals do not, by becoming jurors, forfeit any of their 
constitutionally protected rights to privacy.66 Generally, howev-
er, courts have found that individuals engaging in online com-
munication—chat rooms, blog postings and other publicly 
searchable communication—do not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy with respect to those communications.67 Regard-
less, to allay privacy concerns, many practitioners caution 
against “overt references to a juror’s personal information” that 
has been discovered through outside research.68 
 
courtrooms” after a spate of mistrials based on impermissible outside research 
from jurors themselves). 
 60. See McGee, supra note 59, at 319–20. 
 61. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3. 
 62. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 3.5 (2010) (“[A lawyer shall 
not] communicate ex parte with [a judge, juror, prospective juror or other offi-
cial] during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order.”). 
 63. See id. R. 5.3(c). 
 64. See Glover, supra note 14, at 712 n.22 (“The privacy concerns in the 
voir dire context are identical to those in cases that have recognized the right’s 
existence.”).  
 65. See id. at 711–12. 
 66. See, e.g., People v. James, 710 N.E.2d 484, 489 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (cit-
ing Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Tex. 1995)). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184–85 
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding no expectation of privacy in e-mail and chat room 
discussions); Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2001) (finding no expectation of privacy for personal website). 
 68. Hopkins, supra note 9, at 14. 
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D. PREVALENCE OF PRETRIAL INTERNET RESEARCH 
Because the use of pretrial jury research has long been 
sanctioned and acknowledged by the courts,69 attorneys have 
not been shy in their use of Internet research as a litigation 
tool.70 Because the official juror information provided by the 
courts is so limited,71 attorneys use Internet research in an at-
tempt to gain a competitive advantage over the opposing par-
ty.72 Whereas extensive research on a jury venire would have 
been prohibitively expensive in the pre-Internet era, attorneys 
can now quickly and anonymously gather an immense amount 
of information about prospective jurors through Internet re-
search.73 
Pretrial Internet research on jurors and prospective jurors 
is now the industry standard for litigators.74 This widespread 
practice has been noted by practitioners,75 scholars,76 journal-
ists,77 and courts themselves.78 Some practitioners even claim 
that to not conduct this research is tantamount to malpractice 
and a failure to zealously advocate for one’s client.79 
Practicing attorneys offer a variety of advice on how best to 
mine the Internet for information on prospective jurors. Google 
searches, Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, consumer complaint 
websites, arrest records,80 jurors’ personal blogs,81 online news-
 
 69. See, e.g., State v. Knerr, 426 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). 
 70. See, e.g., Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 213–15. 
 71. See id. at 212 (“Given the general paucity of information concerning 
prospective jurors officially provided to counsel, such [pretrial Internet] inves-
tigation may be necessary in order to accurately identify those jurors who 
should be challenged.”). 
 72. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 13 (“[R]esearch may reveal detailed in-
dividual profiles of the prospective jurors . . . and may provide you with exclu-
sive information that opposing counsel had not uncovered.”). 
 73. See Redgrave and Stover, supra note 3, at 214 (“The internet’s most 
profound effects can be seen in the type and scope of information that can be 
discovered, as well as the anonymity with which attorneys can now learn in-
timate details about a juror’s personal life.”). 
 74. See id. at 211. 
 75. See, e.g., id. 
 76. See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 51, at 1. 
 77. See, e.g., John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Google and Twitter, Mis-
trials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1. 
 78. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10 (noting a judge’s failed attempt to cur-
tail attorney’s research of prospective jurors). 
 79. See supra note 12.  
 80. Redgrave and Stover, supra note 3, at 214. 
 81. Rosalind R. Greene & Jan Mills Spaeth, Are Tweeters or Googlers in 
Your Jury Box?, 46 ARIZ. ATT’Y 38, 45 (2010). 
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papers’ letters to the editor, online petitions, campaign contri-
butions, club membership pages,82 and online public records83 
are all rife with potentially relevant information. Some practi-
tioners even advocate asking prospective jurors about their In-
ternet usage so attorneys can narrow the focus of their re-
search.84 
While pretrial research has been greatly aided by the In-
ternet and the information sources listed above, such research 
can be contextualized by examining the traditional standards of 
a fair and impartial jury. 
E. DEFINING A FAIR TRIAL AND IMPARTIAL JURY 
The right to an impartial jury is created by an amalgam of 
the Sixth Amendment,85 the Seventh Amendment,86 and the 
Due Process clauses of the Fifth87 and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.88 A partial jury implicates considerable constitutional 
concerns,89 and a verdict delivered by a partial jury may be 
overturned on appeal.90 The Supreme Court has defined an im-
partial jury as one that is “capable and willing to decide the 
case solely on the evidence before it” and not based on outside 
knowledge or prejudice.91  
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Frederick, supra note 11. 
 84. See Vesna Jaksic, A New Headache for Courts: Blogging Jurors, 
LAW.COM (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp? 
id=1174035813248 (“Any lawyer who does not inquire during jury selection 
about a juror’s Internet presence—whether it be a Web site, a blog, an account 
on MySpace or an account on Match.com—hasn’t done their [sic] job.”). 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
 86. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served . . . .”). 
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”). 
 89. McGee, supra note 59, at 303–04 (“The failure to provide an accused 
with a fair hearing essentially strips him of his constitutional right and ‘vio-
lates even the minimal standards of due process.’” (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 
U.S. 717, 722 (1961))). 
 90. See, e.g., Johnson v. Agoncillo, 515 N.W.2d 508, 514–15 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1994) (considering whether alleged juror bias necessitated overturning verdict 
on appeal). 
 91. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). 
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One of the problems with ascertaining the effects that pre-
trial research has on the fairness of trials is one of evidence. 
Because there are so many variables involved, it is difficult to 
say with certainty what influence the jury selection has on the 
outcome of the trial.92 If a prospective juror feels intimidated or 
threatened by the amount of invasive research parties have 
conducted, such research may amount to obstruction of jus-
tice.93 Obstruction of justice is committed, as defined in the rel-
evant federal statute, by “[w]hoever corruptly . . . endeavors to 
influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror . . . in 
the discharge of his duty . . . .”94 This statutory provision also 
applies to prospective jurors.95 
By grafting the new technology of Internet research onto 
the existing framework created by this traditional jurispru-
dence, Part II of this Note examines the practical effect of tech-
nological advances on longstanding notions of trial fairness. 
II.  THE EFFECT OF PRETRIAL INTERNET RESEARCH ON 
FAIRNESS OF TRIALS   
Several commentators have noted the seeming unfairness 
of pretrial juror investigation.96 This Part first addresses and 
attempts to dispel the concerns raised by critics of juror inves-
tigation—that the practice infringes upon prospective jurors’ 
privacy, amounts to a manipulation of the jury pool, may lead 
to pretextual strikes for cause, and ultimately undermines the 
fairness of trials. This Part then analyzes the potential benefits 
of pretrial investigation—arguing that the practice decreases 
the likelihood that strikes will be based on stereotypes, in-
creases the number of meritorious strikes for cause, and de-
creases the importance of peremptory strikes. 
A. DISPELLING THE TYPICAL CRITICISMS OF PRETRIAL INTERNET 
JURY RESEARCH 
Critics of pretrial Internet research point to several bases 
for their objections to the practice—among them privacy con-
cerns and concerns over the manipulation of the justice sys-
 
 92. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 463 (“[T]here appears no 
way to assert with certainty that a successful verdict in an actual trial is di-
rectly and solely attributable to . . . jury selection.”). 
 93. See id. at 479. 
 94. 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2006). 
 95. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 324 (1966). 
 96. See, e.g., Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 216–17. 
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tem.97 Each of these concerns is ultimately aimed at ensuring a 
fair trial for all parties.98 This Section identifies and dispels the 
most prevalent of these arguments. 
1. Although Pretrial Jury Investigation Implicates Privacy 
Concerns, Such Actions Do Not Amount to an Invasion of 
Jurors’ Privacy. 
One of the frequent criticisms of both traditional jury con-
sulting and Internet-based research is the potential infringe-
ment on prospective jurors’ right to privacy.99 Even practition-
ers offering tips on how to most effectively research prospective 
jurors acknowledge that such Internet research may be inva-
sive.100 Courts have found that prospective jurors should have 
no reasonable expectation of privacy based on their actions on 
the Internet—their chat room discussions, publicly accessible 
Facebook profiles, or message board posts.101 This standard is 
complicated, however, because much of the research for rele-
vant information is conducted through channels that prospec-
tive jurors have limited control over, such as online church bul-
letins or other social club newsletters.102  
Regardless of whether jurors should have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy regarding their online presence—and thus, 
a constitutional right to privacy—the research and use of such 
information in jury selection certainly implicates privacy con-
cerns.103 When attorneys confront jurors with ostensibly private 
information during the jury-selection process—often in front of 
other prospective jurors, the court, and attorneys—jurors may 
feel like their privacy has been invaded, whether or not the ac-
 
 97. See, e.g., McGee, supra note 59, at 318–20. 
 98. See id. at 318. 
 99. See, e.g., Lisa C. Wood, Social Media Use During Trials: Status Up-
dates from the Jury Box, 24 ANTITRUST 90, 93 (2009). 
 100. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 14 (“[S]ince the foregoing [recommend-
ed] seventeen Internet searches are fairly invasive, a careful lawyer should 
avoid overt references to a juror’s personal information during jury selection 
and trial.”).  
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184–85 
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding chat room and e-mail discussions are not entitled to 
a reasonable expectation of privacy); Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 
831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding personal websites not entitled to a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy). 
 102. See Frederick, supra note 11. 
 103. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 480. 
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tion meets the legal standard for invasion of privacy.104 This re-
action may taint the proceedings by “lead[ing] to resentment of 
the attorney who conducted the inquiry.”105 
Extensive pretrial research of prospective jurors can impli-
cate significant privacy concerns: 
The questioning of prospective jurors can sometimes delve . . . into in-
tensely private and intimate details of the questioned individual’s life 
. . . . [T]hey employ trial consultants . . . who may suggest voir dire in-
terrogations that might violate privacy. This affront to the sensibili-
ties of the panelists might nonetheless be justifiable, on balance, if 
there were clearly demonstrable countervailing benefits . . . . Con-
trasting our system with that of England, where both peremptory 
challenges and pretrial investigations have been virtually eliminated, 
one scholar observed: “In the United States, where voir dire allows for 
vast intrusions into individuals’ lives, the result has not been greater 
impartiality, but a proliferation of methods by which skilled litigators 
and expensive consultants tailor juries to their clients’ needs.”106 
These privacy concerns, however, are ultimately out-
weighed by the perceived benefits of trial consultants. Courts 
have recognized and sanctioned jury consultants’ rights to con-
duct research on prospective jurors.107 Such research often in-
volves more invasive measures than modern-day Internet re-
search, such as seeking information from jurors’ neighbors and 
friends.108 There have been numerous technological advances—
including searchable Internet records and social networking—
that allow for less invasive research into prospective jurors’ 
backgrounds.109 Despite the unease that jurors may feel when 
being confronted with information from their seemingly private 
online profiles, there is generally no privacy right implicated,110 
as long as attorneys abide by their ethical guidelines against 
directly contacting prospective jurors by, for example, adding a 
prospective juror as a “friend” on Facebook to gain access to 
that juror’s profile.111  
 
 104. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 217 (“Being confronted with 
this [seemingly private] information in open court could realistically diminish 
a prospective juror’s feeling of privacy.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 480. 
 107. See, e.g., State v. Knerr, 426 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). 
 108. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 217. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See, e.g., United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184–85 
(S.D. Ohio 1997). 
 111. See Wood, supra note 99 (“[Attorneys] have been admonished in sev-
eral matters where they gained access to confidential Internet sites under 
false pretenses.”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 3.5 (2010) 
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Further, the hypothetical resentment a prospective juror 
may feel toward an attorney asking probing, personal questions 
is too attenuated and theoretical to constitute the basis for an 
unfair trial.112 Practitioners advise attorneys to proceed tactful-
ly when asking questions about information gleaned from pre-
trial Internet research.113 Such tact or avoidance of direct ques-
tioning can help to allay jurors’ privacy concerns.114 Further, 
states may consider implementing a Juror Bill of Rights.115 
While many commentators rest their objections to pretrial 
research on the privacy interests of prospective jurors, many 
others point to the tendency for attorneys to use this infor-
mation to manipulate the justice system. 
2. Allowing Parties to Conduct Internet Research on 
Prospective Jurors Will Lead to Decreased Manipulation of 
Juries and Verdicts. 
Many critics of both jury consulting and pretrial Internet 
research of potential jurors decry the practices as manipulative 
of the trial process.116 Even though peremptory strikes and 
challenges for cause are premised on improving fairness in tri-
als, attorneys often use these techniques instead to gain a com-
petitive advantage over the opposing party.117 This angling for 
advantage seems antithetical to the purposes of voir dire, 
which is to determine whether jurors possess biases that 
should disqualify them from service.118 Further, such methods 
 
(“[A lawyer shall not] communicate ex parte with [a judge, juror, prospective 
juror or other official] during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law 
or court order.”). 
 112. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 463–64 (arguing that it 
would be nearly impossible to show with empirical evidence that jury selection 
alone generally cannot be shown to result in favorable verdicts). 
 113. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 14 (cautioning attorneys not to “refer-
ence a juror’s personal information during jury selection”). 
 114. See id. (arguing that background research on potential jurors can be 
“fairly invasive”). 
 115. See infra Part III.B.  
 116. See, e.g., Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 472–73 (discussing the 
“public perception of the jury being manipulated by psychological devices”). 
 117. See Marni Becker-Avin, The Real Purpose of Voir Dire, THE RIGHT JU-
RY, http://www.therightjury.com/publications_real_purpose.html ( last visited 
Jan. 5, 2012) (“There is conflict between the inherent purpose of voir dire, 
which is to find impartial jurors from a pool representative of the community, 
and the true yet unstated purpose of every attorney, which is to find jurors 
predisposed to their position.”). 
 118. See Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir. 1967) 
(“[T]he purpose of the voir dire is to ascertain disqualifications, not to afford 
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run counter to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Batson v. Ken-
tucky119 and J.E.B. v. Alabama,120 in which the Court con-
demned and outlawed race- and sex-based challenges.121 
Because courts have allowed both pretrial jury investiga-
tion and peremptory challenges, the practice of Internet re-
search of prospective jurors is preferable to the more invasive 
research alternatives. Concerns about the manipulation of jus-
tice by jury research and selection metrics are more pronounced 
when only one side has access to jury consultants and research 
assistants.122 This unequal distribution of resources contributes 
to disparities in the fairness of trial preparation.123 All parties, 
however, are able to ascertain tendencies among prospective 
jurors through the use of comparatively inexpensive Internet 
research.124 This allows parties to make peremptory challenges 
that balance the jury pool by eliminating the most objectionable 
potential members.125 This elimination of jurors with obvious 
predilections will result in the fairest possible jury pool.126 
 
individual analysis in depth to permit a party to choose a jury that fits into 
some mold that he believes appropriate for his case.”); Reid Hastie & Nancy 
Pennington, The O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists’ Reflections on 
The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 67 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 957, 975 (1996) (“[S]cientific jury selection methods are not applied to 
identify and eliminate prejudiced and partial jurors; the major effect of the 
lengthy examinations and the exercise of peremptory challenges is to create 
systematically unrepresentative panels and, sometimes, to produce unbal-
anced juries.”). 
 119. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (forbidding prosecutor from peremptorily challeng-
ing potential jurors solely on account of their race); see also Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (applying the principles of Batson 
to civil trials). 
 120. 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson to cover peremptory challenges 
based on sex). 
 121. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE 
IDEAL DEMOCRACY 175 (1994) (describing jury consulting as contradicting “the 
new ethic” outlined by the Supreme Court in Batson and J.E.B.). 
 122. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 471 (“The impartiality 
mandate would seem most threatened when only one side has access to jury 
science.”). 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 211–12 (“[Pretrial Internet 
juror research] will increasingly level the playing field between the plaintiff ’s 
and defendant’s bar.”). 
 125. See id. at 475 (“Within the adversarial context, it is presumed each 
side will eliminate those prospective jurors most favorable to the other side 
and that the end result will be an impartial jury.”). 
 126. See id. 
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3. Pretrial Jury Research Will Not Lead to an Increase in 
Pretextual Strikes for Cause 
When considering pretrial jury research, many commenta-
tors point out that information gleaned from research may lead 
an attorney to attempt to make a strike for cause where he may 
otherwise invoke a peremptory strike.127 Critics of the practice 
have pointed to this possibility as the one legal foundation on 
which a future ban of jury consulting and pretrial investigation 
could rest.128 
It is possible that an attorney would use a strike for cause 
in an attempt to evade the Batson and J.E.B. decisions and ex-
clude prospective jurors based on either their sex or race.129 If 
an attorney wants to exclude minorities or women from the ju-
ry, she could focus her pretrial research on investigating black 
or female jurors’ Internet presence in an attempt to build a case 
for a challenge for cause. If successful in the challenge for 
cause, the party would retain its allotted number of peremptory 
challenges.130 
These concerns, while not baseless, do not outweigh the 
benefits of pretrial Internet research of prospective jurors. If 
attorneys did attempt to “fish” for information for a pretextual 
strike for cause, there are several safeguards in place that 
would protect the sanctity of the fair trial. First, when consider-
ing a motion to strike for cause, a judge must look at the totali-
ty of the circumstances.131 If an attorney were attempting to 
strike all women or all African-Americans for cause, for exam-
 
 127. See, e.g., Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3 (arguing that questions tai-
lored to individual jurors after research is more likely to lead to a successful 
strike for cause). 
 128. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 481 (arguing that advocates 
of banning jury consultant “must demonstrate something singularly perni-
cious about consulting, such as unduly facilitating or encouraging race—or 
gender—based exclusions outlawed by the Supreme Court . . . .”). 
 129. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson ruling 
to peremptory challenges based on juror’s sex); Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
crete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending Batson’s holding to include civil tri-
als); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (forbidding prosecutor from per-
emptorily challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race); 76 AM. 
JUR. Trials § 61 (“Trial counsel may object . . . to individual veniremen for 
cause, or peremptorily.”).  
 130. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 65 (2000) (“Challenges for cause should be 
pursued by counsel to avoid wasting peremptory challenges.”). 
 131. See, e.g., O’Dell v. Miller, 565 S.E.2d 407, 411 (W. Va. 2002) (“[W]hen 
considering whether to excuse a prospective juror for cause, a trial court is re-
quired to consider the totality of the circumstances and grounds relating to a 
potential request to excuse a prospective juror . . . .”). 
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ple, that trial strategy would be quite transparent. Further, if 
there are pretextual strikes for cause, such strikes would be 
appealable post trial.132 While attorneys “gaming” the peremp-
tory strike system is a concern that has led some to advocate 
for the complete elimination of peremptory strikes,133 the appre-
ciable benefits of the peremptory strike system justify its reten-
tion. 
B. PRETRIAL INTERNET INVESTIGATION IS BENEFICIAL FOR 
JURORS AND DEFENDANTS ALIKE. 
Perhaps because of the notion that researching prospective 
jurors in an attempt to gain a favorable jury pool is tantamount 
to cheating the judicial system, many people react to this prac-
tice with skepticism.134 By examining this practice more closely, 
however, several benefits of pretrial juror investigation emerge. 
1. Jurors Will Be Excluded Based on Stereotype-Alone Less 
Often 
In attempting to create their ideal jury pool, attorneys of-
ten exercise their peremptory strikes to remove potential jurors 
based on little more than a stereotype or a hunch.135 Courts 
have, in dicta, frowned on disqualifying jurors on stereotypes 
alone, but have not held such disqualification illegal.136 With 
prospective jurors having more robust online presences, howev-
er, attorneys may now invoke their peremptory strikes based 
on jurors’ actual personalities, activities and predilections.137 
Lawyers may discover information during their Internet re-
search that they would not have been able to uncover using 
traditional voir dire alone.138 Because the information gathered 
 
 132. See, e.g., Holly v. Straub, No. 02-10126-BC, 2004 WL 1765525, at *12 
(E.D. Mich. July 19, 2004) (considering and rejecting claim “that excusing 
. . . jurors for cause was merely a pretext employed to disguise an improper 
racial motive or a substitute for unlawful peremptory strikes”). 
 133. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (finding that the goal of eliminating racial discrimination from jury selec-
tion “can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely”). 
 134. See supra Part II.A.  
 135. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 465. 
 136. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) (finding a peremptory 
strike based on a stereotype “denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror”). 
 137. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 466 (“Without external in-
formation, attorneys almost inevitably rely on stereotypes and intuitions.”). 
 138. See Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E-Discovery 
Frontier, 66 BENCH & B. MINN., Nov. 2009, at 22–23 (“Trial consultants regu-
larly use Internet research as a means of vetting prospective jurors and learn-
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from this outside research is more “detailed and accurate” than 
an attorney’s stereotype or intuition about prospective jurors,139 
attorneys will be better able to accurately and effectively use 
their peremptory strikes.140 
Many commentators advocate for the elimination of per-
emptory strikes in order to allay concerns about their manipu-
lative nature and potential misuse.141 Former Supreme Court 
Justice Thurgood Marshall argued for completely eliminating 
peremptory strikes.142 One of the main objections to such chal-
lenges is that they, by necessity, rely on attorneys’ excluding 
prospective jurors based on stereotypes.143 By allowing noninva-
sive pretrial Internet research on prospective jurors, however, 
attorneys’ reliance on stereotypes in invoking peremptory chal-
lenges—and the constitutional objection to such reliance—will 
diminish. 
2. There Will Be More Legitimate Strikes for Cause 
When exercised for legitimate reasons, strikes for cause are 
almost universally upheld.144 If a juror has either a prior rela-
 
ing information jurors may not reveal on jury questionnaires or during voir 
dire, ‘including how they vote, how they spend money and if they’ve spoken 
out on controversial issues.’” (citing Carol J. Williams, Jury Duty? You May 
Want to Edit Your Online Profile, L.A TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008)); Greene & 
Spaeth, supra note 81 (“[A]ttorneys can use social networks . . . to learn more 
about their prospective jurors . . . . [P]aying attention to jurors’ social network-
ing, blogs and Web sites can tell a lot about their values, attitudes and experi-
ences that would never be fully revealed in voir dire.”).  
 139. Nesson, supra note 51, at 2. 
 140. See id. (predicting that technological advances in jury investigation 
will lead to increased transparency in peremptory strikes and may eventually 
force courts “either to rationalize peremptory strikes or eliminate them  
altogether”). 
 141. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE 
AMERICAN COURTROOM 224 (1994) (“Eliminating peremptory challenges 
means destroying the only means through which lawyers can . . . ‘get a jury 
you like the look of ’ . . . . And it would mean that decades of stereotypes about 
how people of various ethnic groups are likely to vote would become moot. 
Black and white, fat and skinny, young and old, transit worker and physicist 
all would be treated alike.”). 
 142. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J.,  
concurring). 
 143. See, e.g., Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohib-
iting Peremptory Challenges that Violate a Prospective Juror ’s Speech and As-
sociation Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567, 590–92 (1996). 
 144. See 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 66 (2000) (explaining that review of trial 
judges’ grants of strikes for cause are reviewed on appeal under an abuse of 
discretion standard); see also, e.g., Black v. CSX Transp., Inc., 648 S.E. 2d 610, 
617 (W. Va. 2007) (finding that trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
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tionship with the parties, attorneys, or witnesses, or, has a 
provable bias against one party, he will not contribute to a fair 
and impartial jury pool.145 Pretrial Internet research on pro-
spective jurors assists meritorious strikes for cause by poten-
tially revealing something that would disqualify a juror on its 
own basis or by providing a questioning avenue for attorneys to 
follow in voir dire. By tailoring their questions, attorneys may 
increase their likelihood of discovering something during voir 
dire that could lead to a challenge for cause.146 Such tailoring is 
important, as many view peremptory challenges as one of the 
only mechanisms for eliminating jurors with a strong suspected 
bias.147 
3. Informal Pretrial Jury Research Equalizes Resources 
Between Wealthy and Non-Wealthy Parties 
One of the most important roles that pretrial jury research 
serves is as an equalizer between wealthy and nonwealthy par-
ties. Whereas only attorneys for wealthy parties can usually af-
ford jury consultants, any attorney with an Internet connection 
can conduct online research on prospective jurors.148 This is es-
pecially important since the root of many of the fairness con-
cerns outlined above is the fear that parties have dispropor-
tionate resources.149 Since Internet research provides both 
parties with the same opportunities at their fingertips, fewer 
advantages will inhere to the wealthier parties.150 Smaller law 
 
a lawyers repeated motions for cause). 
 145. See, e.g., 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 68 (2000) ( listing factors to consider 
whether a juror will be fair and impartial when deciding whether to dismiss 
for cause). 
 146. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3 (“Any insight into a juror’s per-
sonality permits a trial attorney to tailor his or her voir dire questions in such 
a way as to maximize the likelihood of revealing a particular trait that may 
support a challenge for cause.”). 
 147. See, e.g., Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 484 (“If the jurisdiction 
is one that limits voir dire inquiry, or prospective jurors are not candid about 
their biases, the voir dire process will not provide adequate opportunity to cre-
ate grounds for a challenge for cause.”). 
 148. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 211–12. 
 149. See, e.g., Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 473 (“Instead of a jury 
representing a cross-section of the values of the community, it may seem a 
body stacked with people holding biases favoring the side with the trial con-
sultant, or the best trial consultant.”). 
 150. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 13 (“[T]he lawyer’s team can accomplish 
the same outside research performed by jury consultants without the expense.”). 
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firms will also be able to better compete with their larger  
counterparts.151  
Further, the Internet allows attorneys to use jury investi-
gation in smaller cases.152 This capability will ensure that even 
when there are small amounts at stake, parties will have the 
benefit of research on prospective jurors.153 If pretrial Internet 
research is a beneficial practice, as this Note argues it is, then 
the process should be available to every party in every jury tri-
al. The cost-effective and equalizing nature of Internet research 
makes this a feasible goal.154 
4. Pretrial Internet Research Makes Juries Inherently More 
Fair and Impartial 
Ultimately, the benefits described above lead to the conclu-
sion that permitting attorneys to conduct research on prospec-
tive jurors causes the resulting jury pool to be fairer and more 
impartial. Because resources are better balanced between par-
ties, the jury pool will not favor one side, and parties will bal-
ance each other out in their peremptory strikes.155 Strier and 
Shestowsky, in their analysis of the effect of jury consultants 
on the fairness of trials, write: 
Within the adversarial context, it is presumed each side will elimi-
nate those prospective jurors most favorable to the other side and 
that the end result will be an impartial jury. Yet this assumes equal 
resources and skills for the two sides. The viability of the adversary 
system to ensure a fair and impartial jury and trial, in jury selection 
as well as in other stages of the trial, is sorely tested when the adver-
saries possess unequal resources. In this light, the major ethical prob-
lem with social science in the courtroom is not the techniques them-
selves but rather the fact that, in our society, the condition for 
equality of resources is most often not met.156 
Because of the increasing use of Internet research to gath-
er information on prospective jurors, the resources of wealthy 
and nonwealthy parties have, to a large extent, been equal-
 
 151. See Jonathan M. Redgrave, Litigation and Technology: How the Inter-
net is Changing the Practice, 47 THE FED. LAW., Jan. 2000, at 25, 25 (“As a re-
sult [of the Internet], smaller firms can now access research materials just as 
quickly and efficiently as their larger counterparts.”). 
 152. See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 3, at 211–12 (“The internet’s vast 
information resources permit litigators, even in small cases, to immediately 
access information about prospective jurors . . . .”). 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 475 (citing VALERIE P. HANS 
& NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 93–94 (1986)). 
 156. Id. 
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ized.157 The equalizing nature of this pretrial research dispels 
the concerns that unequal resources lead to different levels of 
trial preparation, and ultimately to unfair trials.158 
Further, pretrial Internet research, coupled with tradition-
al voir dire questioning, is much more likely to reveal actual bi-
ases that would preclude a juror from being able to decide the 
case based only on the presented evidence.159 Thus, by aug-
menting traditional voir dire with outside Internet research, 
attorneys will ultimately be able to strike down more prospec-
tive jurors that would be prejudiced against their position. 
With each side striking prejudiced jurors, the resulting jury 
pool is increasingly balanced and impartial. 
III.  A COPROMISED SOLUTION: MORE COURT 
FACILITATION OF PRETRIAL INTERNET RESEARCH, 
MORE CONCERN FOR PROSPECTIVE JURORS’ PRIVACY 
RIGHTS   
As outlined above, there are numerous appreciable benefits 
to pretrial Internet research of prospective jurors—jurors being 
excluded from service for their actual beliefs and not stereo-
types, an increase in successful strikes for cause, an equaliza-
tion of pretrial strategies between wealthy and less fortunate 
parties, and an increase in the fairness and impartiality of ju-
ries.160 Accordingly, courts should uniformly release potential 
juror lists prior to trial in order to give attorneys ample time to 
conduct research on prospective jurors. Because there are con-
siderable privacy concerns for jurors, however, state legisla-
tures should pass a standard “Juror Bill of Rights” to allay the-
se legitimate privacy concerns. 
A. COURTS SHOULD UNIFORMLY RELEASE LISTS OF POTENTIAL 
JURORS PRIOR TO TRIAL 
As it stands, many, but not all courts release to attorneys 
lists of potential jurors prior to the start of trial.161 In order to 
 
 157. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 158. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 2, at 475 (discussing how per-
emptory strikes create unfairness mainly in situations where adversarial par-
ties have unequal resources). 
 159. See id. (“Within the adversarial context, it is presumed each side will 
eliminate those prospective jurors most favorable to the other side and that 
the end result will be an impartial jury.”). 
 160. See supra Part II.B.  
 161. See, e.g., State v. Harbison, 238 S.E.2d 449, 452–53 (N.C. 1977). 
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gain the benefits of pretrial online juror investigation—a de-
creased reliance on stereotypes, a leveled playing field between 
wealthy and poorer parties and the resulting impartiality162—
courts should release a list of prospective jurors in advance of 
all jury trials. Further, courts should be more explicit about al-
lowing Internet research of prospective jurors. Currently, prac-
titioners and judges seem to operate in a system of winks and 
nudges—courts have sanctioned pretrial investigation,163 but 
practitioners still advise against mentioning that investigation 
during voir dire.164 The result is the occasional judge admonish-
ing attorneys for what he perceives to be ethically questionable 
behavior.165 By sanctioning and providing this list, however, 
courts will be saying that this pretrial research is both accepta-
ble and expected. 
B. STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT A “JUROR BILL OF RIGHTS” TO 
ALLAY PRIVACY CONCERNS 
Despite the efficacy of pretrial Internet research, prospec-
tive jurors still have legitimate concerns about potential inva-
sions of their privacy.166 The balancing of these concerns with 
the effectiveness of the research should result in a nationwide 
“Juror Bill of Rights,” similar to those that have been proposed 
or enacted in several states.167 Such a Bill of Rights would come 
in the mail with a prospective jurors’ summons and advise the 
juror about her rights. This disclosure would notify the juror 
that she had been selected for the jury pool and inform her that 
her limited personal information has been released to attorneys 
who are bound by ethical codes and the rules of the court to 
keep such information confidential. This enclosure would fur-
ther notify the juror that attorneys for both parties have the 
right to conduct publicly available Internet searches for rele-
vant information about the juror. Finally, this Bill of Rights 
 
 162. See supra Part II.B. 
 163. See, e.g., State v. Knerr, 426 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) 
(“There is no doubt that pretrial investigations of prospective jurors are both 
legal and common.”). 
 164. See Hopkins, supra note 9, at 14 (cautioning against “overt reference 
to a juror’s personal information” that has been discovered through outside 
research). 
 165. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10. 
 166. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.  
 167. See, e.g., B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Ari-
zona Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280, 285 (1996) (showing that a factor in Ari-
zona jury reform was promulgating a “Bill of Rights” for Arizona jurors). 
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would provide contact information for the court, and encourage 
prospective jurors to report attorneys who attempt to contact 
them through online social media. 
This proposed system would have immense benefits for ju-
rors, courts, and the parties themselves. Jurors would feel that 
their privacy interests are being protected by the court, and the 
contact information would provide them with an outlet if they 
feel those privacy rights were being trampled. The court would 
benefit because with jurors vigilant for privacy-related ethical 
violations, practitioners would be less likely to cross impermis-
sible boundaries. Finally, the parties would benefit because this 
previously surreptitious practice would be brought out into the 
open and officially sanctioned by the courts. 
  CONCLUSION   
Pretrial Internet research on prospective jurors is now a 
widespread practice among attorneys. Attorneys have long re-
searched prospective jurors either themselves or through jury 
consultants, but the Internet has made such research much 
more cost- and time-effective. Because such research seems an-
tithetical to the system of justice, it implicates several policy 
and procedural concerns—commentators have argued that it 
invades juror’s privacy, amounts to manipulation of the justice 
system, and may lead to pretextual strikes for cause.  
Ultimately, however, this practice of Internet-based re-
search has many advantages over traditional jury investigation 
and consulting. Among these are an increased balance between 
rich and poor parties, jury selection based on actual knowledge 
instead of stereotype, and an increased success rate in attempts 
to strike jurors for cause. By acknowledging this pretrial re-
search as an effective means of trial preparation, while main-
taining jurors’ privacy rights through the proposed Juror Bill of 
Rights, courts can further this trend towards fairer and more 
impartial juries. 
 
